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Has the ECB lost its mind?■ This Policy brief analyses the recent expansionary decisions of the ECB in
September 2019, which are now under scrutiny and have even been criticized.
■ Recent facts confirm the need of an expansionary monetary policy, as inflation
expectations are still decreasing and credit remains weak. 
■ We pay a special attention to the three types of risk evoked in the public debate.
■ First, it has been argued that low interest rates could increase the households
saving rate due to an income effect. We show that this does not materialize on
recent data. We observe such a correlation only for Germany, and this already
before 2008, casting some doubt on the direction of the causality.
■ Second, it is argued that the banks' profits are at risk because of low interest rates.
We show that banks' profits are steady and are recovering since 2012, and that
the new measures are not expected to have a negative effect on bank's profits.
■ Third, using a macro-finance assessment of financial imbalances, we do not
observe the emerging of bubbles on housing and stock market. 
■ Although the downside should be carefully analysed, we conclude that the critics
of the recent expansionary monetary policy does not rely on sound evidence.
■ Finally, and in any case, a fiscal expansion would reduce the need for expan-
sionary policies. A discussion of the euro area fiscal stance is needed.
Since 2009 the ECB has implemented a large set of measures—standard
and non-standard—to fix the financial crises, deal with the economic slump and the
weakness of inflation. At the end of 2017, discussions regarding the phasing out of
unconventional measures had started and even if interest rates were expected to be
maintained at low levels for a sustained period, net assets purchases have been
ended in December 2018. However, the economic slowdown and especially the
reduction of inflation and expected inflation have led the ECB to announce new
measures on 12 September 2019. Mario Draghi pointed to “the need for a highly
accommodative stance of monetary policy for a prolonged period of time” to
motivate a list of 5 measures, which are very representative of the toolkit now at the
disposal of central banks. It entails indeed standard measures, such as the reduction
of the policy rate, as well as non-standard measures: assets purchase, forward
guidance, conditional liquidity provision and the introduction of a tiering system for
the—negative—remuneration of excess reserves. 
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1.
As Sabine Lautenschläger, Jürgen 
Stark had also resigned from the ECB 
Board in September 2011 to express 
his disagreement concerning the 
outright purchases of public             
securities.
2.
Brunnermeier, M. K., & Koby, Y. 
(2018). “The reversal interest rate”, 
NBER Working Paper, No. 25406.The announcements made in September have been under heavy criticisms and it 
seems that the measures were adopted at a very narrow majority. The German member 
of the Board, Sabine Lautenschläger, has resigned since 31 October 2019 and several 
other members of the Governing council have publicly dissented expressing concerns 
about the risks associated to the ultra-loose monetary policy. Criticisms have also come 
from six former European central bankers, including Jürgen Stark and Otmar Issing, 
who were both chief economists of the ECB.1 According to John Plender in the 
Financial Times, “the ECB critics are right to worry about ultra-loose monetary policy 
(because) moral hazard neuters market discipline, (…) paving the way for hyperinfla-
tion (like) in the Weimar Republic, (…) in Zimbabwe (…) and in Venezuela (…)”. 
Criticisms have not only arisen from central bankers and had also gained citizens and 
the banks lobby who expressed worries about the return on their saving and their 
profitability. While non-standard monetary policy, backed by a burgeoning literature, 
was seen as a major instrument at the hands of central banks to magnify the expan-
sionary stance of monetary policy, doubts are now raised not only about the potential 
side-effect of those decisions but even on the effectiveness of further softening. In a 
recent theoretical paper, Brunnermeier and Koby (2018) suggest that below a given 
rate—called the “reversal rate”—monetary policy would become contractionary 
instead of expansionary.2 Regarding those criticisms, we examine why Mario Draghi 
has taken such decisions and whether these measures will succeed in reaching the infla-
tion target or if they would mainly increase risks in the euro area. This Policy Brief deals 
with those issues. It notably reminds the expected effects of monetary policy decisions 
and assess the relevance of the criticisms recently raised.
The Governing Council policy decisions of  
12 September 2019
The Governing Council of the ECB announced a series of expansionary decisions 
after its 12 September 2019 meeting. One particularity of this announcement is that it 
covers a wide range of conventional and non-standard policy tools. On the side of 
conventional measures, the ECB decided to reduce the deposit facility rate by 10bp, 
bringing it further into negative territory at -0.5%. It also signalled that this is not a 
lower bound as the policy statement mentions that interest rates will remain “at 
present levels, or lower”.
Table 1. The 12 September 2019 decisions
Policy instruments Implementation details
Policy rates
10bp deposit facility rate cut, from -0.40% to -0.50%
Possibility for more cuts
Tiering system
Exemption of part of excess reserves 
Threshold at 6 times the required reserves
Forward guidance Linked to core inflation
QE
New Asset Purchase Programme (APP)
20 €Bn per month
No end date
TLTRO
3rd programme
Maturities extended to 3 years
Removal of the 10bp spread over the deposit facility rate
Source: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2019/html/ecb.is190912~658eb51d68.en.html.
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TLTRO are refinancing operations 
proposed to credit institutions in the 
euro area conditional to the total 
amount of loans granted to the non-
financial private sector, excluding 
loans to households for house       
purchase.On the side of non-standard policy measures, the most notable one is the introduc-
tion of a two-tier system for reserve remuneration in which part of banks’ holdings of 
excess liquidity will be exempted from the (negative) deposit facility rate. The two-tier 
system applies to excess reserves held in reserve accounts, but does not apply to excess 
liquidity held at the ECB’s deposit facility. The excess reserve holdings beyond the 
minimum reserve requirements that is exempted from the deposit facility rate is deter-
mined as a multiple of a commercial bank’s minimum reserve requirements. The 
multiplier will be the same for all commercial banks. The non-exempted excess reserves 
will continue to be remunerated at the deposit facility rate (or zero percent depending 
which is lower). The Governing Council has decided to set the initial multiplier at six, 
but this could vary over time.
Another clear innovation in the use of policy instruments relates to the use of the 
forward guidance policy. The commitment of the Governing Council to keep interest 
rates low for a long period is now explicitly linked to core inflation. The policy state-
ment makes it now crystal clear that the future evolution of the policy rates will depend 
on whether “we have seen the inflation outlook robustly converge to a level sufficiently 
close to, but below, 2% within our projection horizon, and such convergence has been 
consistently reflected in underlying inflation dynamics”. There are two information here: 
the forward guidance becomes state-contingent rather than time-contingent and the 
state-variable is not headline but core inflation. However, the ECB still defines price 
stability using headline inflation, measured by the year-on-year increase in the Harmo-
nised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), close but below 2%.
The Governing Council also decided to launch a new series of targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTRO III) with new modalities compared to the previous 
TLTRO II programme.3 The maturities of the operation are extended from 2 to 3 years. 
In addition, the 10bp spread over the deposit facility rate for banks whose eligible net 
lending exceeds the benchmark is removed. For banks for which net lending is not 
large enough, so not eligible, the interest rate of operations is the one of main refi-
nancing operations (so 0% currently).
Figure 1. QE monthly asset purchases
In € bn
Note: The date until which asset purchases will continue is so far unknown and 2022 is only indicative here.
Source: ECB. 
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This quantification of the target was 
clarified in 2003. From 1999 to 
2003, it was only mentioned that    
inflation should be below 2% target 
in the medium-term. The 2% level 
was consequently interpreted as an 
upper limit. Implicitly inflation be-
tween 0 and 2% would have been 
tolerated. By adding that inflation 
should be close to 2%, it makes this 
target a reference value.Finally, the Governing Council decided to reignite net purchases under the same 
conditions as the original asset purchase programme (APP) at a monthly pace of 
€20 billion (see Figure 1). One key element of this new QE program compared to the 
previous one is that it is now open-ended. Rather than announcing an overall amount for 
a given period, announcing a rhythm of monthly purchases without an end date might 
be a way to signal that the Governing council sees the transmission channel of QE 
through flows or purchases rather than the stock of bonds acquired. In the press confer-
ence following the policy statement, Mario Draghi clarified that the allocation of the 
purchases would be “by and large the same asset mix” than before, such that the public 
sector purchase programme (PSPP) would represent €16bn (80%), the corporate sector 
purchase programme (CSPP) €3bn (15%) and the covered bond purchase programme 
(CBPP3) and asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) €1bn (5%).
Why such an expansionary package?
As stressed in the press conference following these monetary decisions, the ECB has 
considered that further expansionary measures were needed to support inflation in a 
context of weakening growth. The primary objective of the ECB is indeed to maintain 
price stability. To that end, the ECB defines price stability as a year-on-year increase in 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area below but close to 
2%.4 More recently, Mario Draghi indicated that the ECB was concerned by excess 
inflation as much as by the lack of inflation suggesting that it would react symmetrically 
when inflation is below or above the target, strengthening the importance of this refer-
ence for the conduct of monetary policy. Beyond the objective of price stability, the 
ECB is expected to support the “general economic policies in the Union”, and mainly 
employment and growth.
Figure 2. Headline and core inflation and long-term inflation expectations in the euro area
In %
Note: Long-term inflation expectations are measured with 5-year / 5-year forward inflation swaps and are available only 
since 2012. 
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream.
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5.
The OFCE October forecast for infla-
tion in the euro area is 1.2 %.The recent inflation and GDP growth figures have shown some signs of slowdown. 
Since January 2014, the average inflation in the euro area stands at 0.9 % and it has 
recently decreased in line with the fall of energy prices (see Figure 2). Yet, even under-
lying (or core) inflation which does not account for volatile prices is well below 2 % and 
has fluctuated around 1 % for several months. While inflation has been in line with the 
target before the Global financial crisis (2,1% on average from 1999 to the end of 
2007), it has been significantly below 2% in average from January 2008 to august 2019.
As the effect of monetary policy are transmitted with some lags, it is crucial for 
central banks not to focus excessively on current inflation but to adjust the stance of 
monetary policy regarding the expected inflation. According to the ECB staff projec-
tions released in September, inflation is expected to stand at 1 % in 2020, 0.4 point 
below the June’s forecast.5 Besides, long-term market expectations, measured by the 
five-year ahead inflation for 5 years, have continuously decreased since 2018 and stood 
close to 1.2 % since the start of 2019. Survey measures do not show more signs of 
acceleration. According to the recent “Survey of Professional Forecasters” for which 
long-term expectations are much stickier, expected inflation at a 5-year horizon 
amounts to 1.7 %, 0.2 point less than in 2018-Q4. Consequently, all forecasts suggest 
that inflation will remain below 2 % in the following quarters and that it could be 
anchored to a level significantly below the level targeted by the ECB. Given the 
mandate of the ECB, monetary policy is expected to remain expansionary. If the 
current stance of monetary policy does not provide enough stimulus to raise inflation in 
the medium-term, it is consistent with the mandate and the strategy elaborated by the 
ECB to take additional measures as those that were announced in September.
Finally, economic growth in the euro area has also been revised downward and is 
now expected to reach 1.2 % in 2020 according to the OFCE (OFCE Policy brief, 60) but 
also to the European Commission and the Eurosystem’s staff. The unemployment rate 
would stabilize at 7.4 % in 2020-2021 close to the lowest value reached before the 
outbreak of the 2008-2009 recession. However, risks (trade war, Brexit) mainly point 
toward a slowdown of the economy. The deterioration of the growth perspectives and 
Figure 3. Credit in the euro area
In % of GDP
Source: ECB.
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Rue de la Banque n° 56 : « La courbe 
de Phillips existe-t-elle encore ? », 
12/02/2018.rising uncertainty in the global economic and financial environment therefore provide 
incentives for the ECB to ease monetary policy.
The measures announced by the ECB in September would support domestic 
demand and employment in the euro area. According to the Phillips curve, it would 
therefore help to raise inflation although it must be acknowledged that the Phillips 
curve has flattened. Yet, economists from the Banque de France have recently esti-
mated that it would still be relevant in the euro area.6 Besides, the ECB announced a 
TLTRO-III programme, motivated by subdued growth of credit to non-financial agents. 
The aim of TLTRO is indeed to enhance favourable financing conditions for banks and 
to give them incentives to stimulate bank lending to non-financial agents. The first 
programme was announced in June 2014 to deal with the weakness of credit in the 
euro area. A second series started in June 2016. Considering the role of bank lending in 
the financing of non-financial corporations and the continuing decrease in credit ratios 
to households and non-financial corporations, the ECB has considered that it was still 
needed to support bank lending. The ratio of credit-to-GDP for non-financial corpora-
tion has continuously declined since 2009 and has recorded its lowest level since 
September 2004 (see Figure 3). Consequently, the package of measures taken by the 
ECB in September 2019 would be motivated by inflation being below the target, the 
deterioration of growth perspectives in the euro area and by weak credit dynamics. 
What are the expected effects?
The reduction in the deposit facility rate is supposed to ease further credit condi-
tions while the APP purchases aim to reinforce the accommodative impact of the 
deposit facility rate through a reduction of risk premia on both sovereign and corporate 
bonds, via the direct effect of purchases and the indirect effect of portfolio decisions. 
The purpose of the TLTRO programme is to provide favourable credit supply condi-
tions, and to ensure a smooth transmission of the monetary policy stance to 
households and firms. 
Figure 4. Stylised example of the tiering system and the reduction in the deposit facility rate 
Note: y axis in €Bn. The exempt tier is defined by the ECB as a multiple of required reserves set at 6. 
Sources: ECB announcement, authors calculations.
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negative deposit facility rate on banks’ net interest income. Whereas the rationale of a 
negative deposit facility rate on excess reserves is to push interbank interest rates lower 
and to provide incentives to banks to rebalance their activities towards riskier and more 
remunerative bank lending, the tiering system aims to preserve commercial banks’ 
profitability. Some other central banks, the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the Swiss National Bank 
(SNB), the Swedish National Bank (Riksbank) and the Denmark’s Nationalbanken 
(DNB), imposing negative interest rates on reserves have introduced a tiering system. 
For instance, the SNB cut the rate on sight deposits to -75bps in January 2015 and put 
in place a two-tier system where deposits in excess of 20 times the minimum reserve 
requirement would be subject to the negative policy rate. The implementation of a 
tiering system should be viewed as a complementary way to revive the APP purchases. 
The ECB’s balance sheet expanded massively with deposits at the ECB now near 
€1.9 trillion. With 93% of these deposits being subject to negative rates, introducing a 
tiering system would generate significant gains for commercial banks. 
The Figure 4 shows a stylized example of the effect of introducing a tiering system – 
considering the exemption set by the ECB for the first maintenance period – for a bank 
with 11 €Bn of reserves with 1 €Bn of required reserves and 10 €Bn of excess reserves. 
The gain for such a stylized bank would be of 20 €M per year. At the opposite, for a 
bank for which the excess reserves after the implementation of the tiering system 
represent more than 80% of the excess reserves before the implementation (because 
they have only a marginal part of their reserved that are required reserves), then the 
decrease in the deposit rate dominates and the cost increases. Such a case would 
happen if a bank has less than 3.3% of its reserves that are required reserves. As a refer-
ence value, the overall average for this ratio for EA banks is 7.3%. It is nevertheless 
possible that some banks that sold very large quantities of securities to the ECB would 
be in that situation, but in that case, they would have most certainly earned very large 
capital gains from selling these securities.
However, the gain is not shared equally across the Eurozone. Excess reserves are 
concentrated in the core countries (see Table 2). German bank deposits amount to 
about €595bn, so 33% of the total deposit facility, while French banks amount to 
€237bn (28%). Altogether, Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland 
and Luxembourg account for 88% of euro area excess reserves while Italy and Spain 
represent 8% of total excess reserves. Eventually, the gain from the tiering system is 
therefore concentrated in banks in the core countries (2.7 €Bn) whereas the gain for 
banks in the periphery is much smaller (0.9 €Bn). Interestingly, Spanish, Italian, Portu-
guese or Greek banks have some unused exemptions such that they could increase 
their excess reserves at no cost. This regional heterogeneity is also visible in the use of 
the TLTRO programmes. France and Germany have absorbed 29% of ECB’s TLTROs, 
while Italy and Spain amount to almost the double. The two-tier balance will therefore 
rebalance the advantages of ECB non-standard measures in favor of core countries.  
Overall, commercial banks with unused exempted reserves could borrow from the 
ECB (at -0.50%) to take advantage of the carry arbitrage opportunity (with reserves 
remunerated at 0%). A large utilisation of TLTRO-III could help ease tensions in inter-
bank markets and create a favourable environment for bank lending.
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Table 2. Gain and loss for the b
In €, Bn
Befo
Required
reserves
Germany 36
France 26
Netherlands 11
Belgium 6
Finland 2
Austria 4
Luxembourg 4
Core countries 89
Spain 15
Italy 15
Portugal 2
Greece 2
Ireland 2
Cyprus 1
Malta 1
Periphery countries 38
Central eastern countries 5
Total 132
Source: Authors computations, ECB data
and excess reserves. For instance, the tr
bank all excess reserves.
7.
As indicated by the ECB, there are no 
Estonian sovereign debt securities 
that comply with the definition of 
long-term interest rates as used for 
other euro area countries.What are the potential risks?
The negative interest rate policy has pushed down the overnight interest rate at 
historical low level. Long term sovereign yields have also declined not only because of 
the 12 September decisions and the implementation of assets purchases but also 
because demand for safe (sovereign) assets remains high. In October 2019, long-term 
interest rates—with a ten year maturity—were in negative territory for 9 out of 18 euro 
area countries.7 The highest interest rate was recorded for Greece where it stood at 
1.3 %. Actually, nominal short and long term rates have reached their lowest value 
since 1999. Considering historical data, it is also the case for nominal interest rates in 
France since 1870. However, looking at the real interest rate—defined as the difference 
between the nominal interest rate and the current inflation rate—leads to a more 
nuanced picture. Even after removing the exceptional episodes of World War I and II, 
real long-term interest rates have been negative in the 1920s, 1930s and 1970s 
(Figure 5). From 1974 to 1980, the average long-term real interest rate amounted to 
-0.8% with a lowest level at -3.1% in 1974. While the most recent period experiences 
the lowest nominal interest rates since more than a century, it does not correspond to 
uncharted territory and so is not as exceptional in terms of real interest rates.
As mentioned above, the decrease of interest rates is expected to boost aggregate 
demand and notably investment and private consumption. Nevertheless, there may be 
adverse effects with low and even negative interest rates. First, the positive impact of 
lower interest rate on consumption is driven by a substitution effect. Households face a 
trade-off between present consumption and future consumption (saving) and lower 
anking system of the reduction in the deposit facility rate and the tiering system
re 12 September 2019 With tiering system and reduction in deposit facility rate
 Excess 
reserves
Cost with        
-0.40%
Cost with        
-0.50% Exemptions
Non-exempt 
excess 
reserves
Excess 
reserves 
gross cost
Tiering 
system gain
Overall 
gain
595 2,38 2,98 216 379 1,90 1,08 0,49
512 2,05 2,56 156 356 1,78 0,78 0,27
158 0,63 0,79 66 92 0,46 0,33 0,17
61 0,24 0,31 36 25 0,13 0,18 0,12
91 0,36 0,46 12 79 0,40 0,06 -0,03
34 0,14 0,17 24 10 0,05 0,12 0,09
121 0,48 0,61 24 97 0,49 0,12 0,00
1572 6,29 7,86 534 1038 5,19 2,67 1,10
84 0,34 0,42 90 0 0 0,42 0,34
63 0,25 0,32 90 0 0 0,32 0,25
10 0,04 0,05 12 0 0 0,05 0,04
0 0,00 0,00 12 0 0 0,00 0,00
24 0,10 0,12 12 12 0,06 0,06 0,04
12 0,05 0,06 6 6 0,03 0,03 0,02
4 0,02 0,02 6 0 0 0,02 0,02
197 0,79 0,99 228 18 0,09 0,90 0,70
19 0,08 0,10 30 0 0,00 0,10 0,08
1788 7,15 8,94 792 1056 5,28 3,66 1,87
. These computations rely on the assumption that banks within each country are homogenous in terms of the ratio of required 
ue cost/gain would be different in the extreme case in which one bank would concentrate all required reserves and another 
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Jordà, Òscar, Moritz Schularick, and 
Alan M. Taylor (2017). “Macrofinan-
cial History and the New Business  
Cycle Facts.” in NBER Macroecono-
mics Annual 2016, volume 31, edited 
by Martin Eichenbaum and Jonathan 
A. Parker. Chicago: University of    
Chicago Press.
Aizenman, Joshua, Yin-Wong 
Cheung, and Hiro Ito (2019). “The 
interest rate effect on private saving: 
Alternative perspectives.” Journal of 
International Commerce, Economics 
and Policy, 10(1).interest rates decrease the relative price of present consumption. Households have less 
incentives to save and more to borrow. The impact may yet be mitigated or reversed 
through a revenue effect according to which the reduction of interest rate leads house-
holds to increase saving as they seek to offset the loss of saving revenues stemming 
from the decrease of interest rate. 
There has been yet a growing controversy in Germany on the side-effects of the low 
rate policy. The ECB monetary policy has been accused to cut down saving revenues of 
German’s households, being responsible for high household savings and therefore low 
consumption and low growth. It is therefore considered in the public debate that the 
revenue effect is stronger than the substitution effect. The Figure 6 shows the correla-
tion between households saving rates and interest rates for a panel of the 4 biggest 
countries of the euro area and suggests that this mechanism is indeed at work. The link 
between savings and interest rates was null before 2008, consistent with Aizenman et 
al. (2019) that have shown that, at the macroeconomic level, the effect of real interest 
rates on private saving is not significant, but is negative since 2011 when the ECB 
massively cut interest rates. If this result were a general one, it would imply that a 
reduction in the interest rate would increase savings. We now show that this result is 
not general and rely on a composition bias.
Aizenman et al. (2019) have argued that the revenue effect—lower interest rate 
increases saving—would dominate for countries with a well-developed financial market 
and an ageing population. This may explain why the low interest rate policy has been a 
concern for the euro area where population is aging. However, this relationship may 
also be biased by the fact that households’ saving rates depend on retirement national 
systems, unemployment benefit national systems, homeownership rates, and cultural 
or historical national specificities. In addition, it may also be the case that it is the low 
growth environment since 2011 that drives both the policy response of the ECB and 
the households’ saving rate, i.e. a standard example of an omitted variable bias. 
Figure 5. Interest rates for France: a historical perspective
In %
Source: Macrohist database, see Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2017).
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rates for the same countries of the euro area but now country by country. While it is
true that the saving ratio has recently increased in Germany together with interest rates
declining, this was already the case before 2008 when the levels of interest rates were
higher. The revenue effect seems to be always stronger in Germany whatever the level
of the interest rate. However, the negative correlation between the saving rate and the
long-term interest rates observed for Germany cannot be generalized to other euro
area countries. In the recent period, the relationship is positive for all three other coun-
tries. This tends to support the idea that there is a German specificity at work here—
possibly due to the very low homeownership rate in Germany, among other
things—more than a general rule. Overall, the argument that the low ECB policy rates
are responsible for the low euro area growth through their effects on savings seems
especially weak.
Monetary policy has also been criticized by banks as it would reduce the profits from
banking intermediation. Due to their deposit-taking and lending activities, the profita-
bility of banks partially depends on the difference between the interest rate applied to
loans—generally at long maturities—and the interest rate applied to deposits, which a
short maturity. Assets purchase would contribute to flattening the yield curve with
would reduce interest rate margins. The effect may be strengthened by the negative
interest rate policy if the pass-through of interest rates cuts is stronger for interest rates
applied to loans compared to interest rate on deposits. If the interests paid to house-
hold and business on their deposits cannot be negative by choice—the bank is
reluctant to lose customers—or by legal constraints, commercial banks would see their
margins reduce. The argument, however, needs to be nuanced since TLTRO
programmes allow banks to finance themselves at negative rates from the central bank.
Profitability may also increase since lower interest rates reduce the interest expense for
Figure 6. Interest rates and saving rates in the 4 biggest EA countries 
Note: Red circles are for the period before the crisis (2008Q2), the empty grey circles are for the period of the crisis
(2008Q3 to 2011Q2) and the blue circles are for the period starting when Mario Draghi becomes President of the ECB
(2011Q3).
Source: Eurostat. 
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Dell’Ariccia G., Laeven L. and Suarez 
G., (2017). “Bank Leverage and 
Monetary Policy’s Risk-taking     
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States.” Journal of Finance, 72(2), 
613–654.
Madaschi C. and Nuevo I., (2017). 
“The profitability of banks in a con-
text of negative monetary policy 
rates: the cases of Sweden and Den-
mark.” European Central Bank. Occa-
sional Paper Series, No. 195.
Boungou, W., (2019). “Negative In-
terest Rates, Bank Profitability and 
Risk-taking.” OFCE Working Paper, 
n° 10.firms and households and decrease the default rate on credits. The effect of interest 
rates on banks profitability is therefore an empirical issue. There is however no 
consensus. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) find a negative impact whereas Madaschi and 
Nuevo (2017) find a positive impact. The effect of the negative interest rate policy has 
been specifically analysed by Boungou (2019) from a sample of 2442 banks operating 
in the 28 countries of the European Union. He finds that negative interest rates have 
weigh down on banks’ margins but not on profitability since banks have been able to 
raise non-interest income (commissions and fees). These conclusions are supported by 
the recent dynamics of profits and margins indicators in the euro area. There is indeed 
no evidence of declining profits and even no reduction in the net interest margins 
(NIM) since the introduction of negative interest rates in the euro area (Figure 8), nor in 
Germany (Figure 9) where criticisms against ECB policies are among the fiercest. The 
returns on assets and on equity were negative in 2011 and 2012 and have steadily 
increased since then.  
The same line of arguments has been used to state that the current environment of 
low interest rates poses strong challenges to insurance companies, that would see their 
Figure 7. Interest rates and saving rates at the national level
Source: Eurostat. Note: Red circles are for the period before the crisis (2008Q2), the empty grey circles are for the period 
of the crisis (2008Q3 to 2011Q2) and the blue circles are for the period starting when Mario Draghi becomes President 
of the ECB (2011Q3).
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12   |   OFCE  policy briefprofitability and solvency negatively affected. This would mainly be due to the main 
characteristic of the insurance business model: these companies hold large amount of 
fixed-term investments in their balance sheet. In particular, the life-insurance business 
is often characterised by the presence of financial guarantees, granting a minimum rate 
of return to policyholders. These guarantees might represent a threat to life-insurance 
companies that sold a large share of these products in the past. However, entry and 
management fees represent a significant share of revenues for insurance companies (in 
parallel to non-interest income for banks) that enable them to buffer the decline in 
interest rates. The Figure 10 shows the turnover and profit of the 13 major euro area 
insurance companies—a very concentrated market where the biggest actor, Allianz, 
Figure 8. Euro area banks’ profits
In %
Source: ECB.
Figure 9. German banks’ profits
In %
Source: ECB.
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See Andrews, D., and F.Petroulakis 
(2019). “Breaking the shackles:  
Zombie firms, weak banks and  
depressed restructuring in Europe.” 
ECB Working Paper, n° 2240.
Hoshi, T. (2006). “Economics of the 
living dead.” The Japanese Economic 
Review, 57(1), 30–49.has a turnover more than 10 times the turnover of the 13th actor, Ageas. Overall, the 
effect of low interest rates on insurance companies’ profits does not seem that stark, at 
least on their future perspectives. As an example, the operating profit of one of the key 
actors of the sector, Axa, went from 4.7 €Bn in 2013, before the introduction of nega-
tive interest rates to 6.2 €Bn in 2018. The risks posed by low interest rates to insurance 
companies seem overstated and it appears categorical from this point of view to 
mention a rise in systemic risk to banks and insurance companies.
Critics of the current expansionary stance of monetary policy in the euro area also 
point out that it would increase the number of “zombie” firms. “Zombie” firms are 
insolvent and less productive firms which are kept alive because they benefit from low 
interest rates charged by banks. They would then contribute to reducing potential 
growth. The reference to “zombie” firms was notably documented for Japan during the 
1990’s. It would be the consequence of low interest rates and bad allocation of banks’ 
lending. The resurgence of this debate in Europe echoes the observed decrease in 
productivity as highlighted by Andrews and Petroulakis (2019). 
The package of measures implemented by the ECB aims to improve the financing 
conditions for non-financial agents and has triggered a reduction in market and retail-
banking interest rates. Interests paid by firms have been reduced from 4.1% of the 
value added in 2014 to 2.8% in 2019Q2. However, low interest rate is not a sufficient 
condition for claiming that the proportion of “zombie” firms has increased. Hoshi 
(2006) classifies a firm as a “zombie” if it benefits from an implicit subsidy from banks, 
meaning that it has interest payments below a minimum required level. The story of 
“zombie” firms is intrinsically related to weak banks or “zombie” banks that should be 
restructured but are kept alive. The problem with “zombie” firms may not stem from 
monetary policy but could result from the persistence of bank troubles.
Figure 10. Turnover and profits of major euro area insurance companies
In €Bn
Note: Expectations for 2019, 2020 and 2021 are the average of market analysts’ expectations. The sample comprises Axa, 
CNP Assurances, Scor, Allianz, Talanx, Hannover Ruckversicherung, Munchener Ruckversicherung, Unipolsai, Generali, 
Mapfre, Ageas, Aegon and NN Group.
Source: Zonebourse.com.
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n° 37.Finally, the very expansionary stance of monetary policy may also threaten financial 
stability by feeding asset price bubbles. Borio and Zabai (2016) for example claim that 
the benefits of unconventional monetary policies would decline while the risks of finan-
cial instability would worsen, echoing the critics raised by Taylor (2009) concerning the 
low interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve between 2001 and 2004 that would have 
fuelled the boom in the housing market and triggered thereafter the subprime crisis. 
With negative policy rates and assets purchases, most of sovereign yields are negative 
in the euro area. Financial investors would search for higher yields and push up stock 
and house prices. However, stock and house prices are still well below the peak 
observed in 2007. Based on a method developed in Blot, Hubert and Labondance 
(2018), there is no sign of strong asset price imbalances in the euro area (Figure 11). 
There may be some local imbalances, housing market in Germany for instance, but 
then, it may not be the single responsibility of monetary policy if markets in other euro 
area countries do not show signs of overheating. 
To conclude, if the ECB critics really wanted higher interest rates, they would 
support the ECB’s call for fiscal stimulus to discharge monetary policy  ■ 
Figure 11. Euro area stock and house price imbalances
Standard deviations
Source: Authors computations, see Blot, Hubert and Labondance (2018).
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